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Multilingual Cross-domain Perspectives on Online Hate Speech 
Tom De Smedt,1 Sylvia Jaki,2 Eduan Kotzé,3 Leïla Saoud,4  
Maja Gwóźdź,5 Guy De Pauw,6 Walter Daelemans 1 
1 University of Antwerp, 2 University of Hildesheim, 3 University of the Free State,  
4 University of Leuven, 5 University of Munich, 6 Textgain 
Abstract. In this report, we present a study of eight corpora of online hate speech, by 
demonstrating the NLP techniques that we used to collect and analyze the jihadist, 
extremist, racist, and sexist content. Analysis of the multilingual corpora shows that 
the different contexts share certain characteristics in their hateful rhetoric. To expose 
the main features, we have focused on text classification, text profiling, keyword and 
collocation extraction, along with manual annotation and qualitative study. 
Keywords: hate speech, social media, text analysis, text profiling, forensic linguistics 
1 Introduction 
Hate crimes have been on the rise,1 2 3 and especially online social media are believed to act as 
a propellant for polarization and radicalization. Previous studies have argued that online 
social media can function as “echo chambers” (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson, 2014), lending 
themselves to the expression of more radical views than face-to-face interaction. As such, hate 
speech is perceived to infiltrate various types of (mainly) political discourse online.  
Hate speech is defined in the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution as “communication 
that disparages a person or a group on the basis of some characteristic such as race, color, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or other characteristic” (Nockleby, 
2000). It is illegal according to Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.4 However, in the US, freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and there is no exception that prohibits hate speech, unless it 
constitutes incitement to imminent crime (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 1969). In the 
EU, the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online 5 defines hate speech as “the 
public incitement to violence or hatred directed to groups or individuals on the basis of 
certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic origin”. 
                                               
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/u-s-hate-crimes-rise-for-second-straight-year-fbi-idUSKBN1DD2BA 
2 http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-hate-crimes-surge-on-brexit-and-militant-attacks-idUSKBN1CM15E 
3 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-rights-idUSKBN1672AB 
4 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 
5 http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm 
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Hate speech laws are now being considered in several countries such as the UK and France,6 
Germany (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz)7 and South Africa (B9–2018).8 Due to the pervasive 
nature of hate speech, such laws are often notoriously vague,9 10 which can lead to potential 
problems with the infringement on freedom of speech of private citizens. The response by IT 
companies has also been rather cautious, for example with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg 
stating before US Congress that the problem can be solved in “5-10 years”. 
Hate speech online presents a new challenge for Natural Language Processing (NLP). The aim 
of this study is to identify common features of hate speech across domains, and to advance 
automatic detection. We collected 8 social media text corpora for a multilingual and cross-
domain study of hate speech, composed of jihadism, right- and left-wing extremism, racism, 
and sexism (section 2). We provide an overview of the NLP techniques that we have used to 
gain insight from these resources, in particular using text classification, keyword extraction, 
collocation extraction (section 3) and stylometry and sentiment analysis (section 4). 
2 Methods and Materials 
2.1 Context 
Table 1 provides an overview of our target domains, followed by a summary of the social and 
political context of each domain in respective countries: 
DOMAIN CONTEXT LANGUAGE 
JIHADISM Islamic State (ISIS) propaganda EN / AR 
EXTREMISM far-right activism in Germany DE 
EXTREMISM far-right activism in Belgium & the Netherlands NL 
EXTREMISM political debate in the UK / US / Canada EN 
SEXISM incel subculture (male supremacy) EN 
RACISM far-left activism in South Africa EN 
RACISM far-right activism in France FR 
RACISM racist comments in Belgium NL 
Table 1. Overview of target domains. 
                                               
6 http://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-announce-joint-campaign-to-tackle-online-radicalisation 
7 http://www.buzer.de/NetzDG_Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz.htm 
8 http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/hcbill/hatecrimes.html 
9 http://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law 
10 http://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/21/south-african-move-hate-speech-step-too-far 
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JIHADISM 
During the Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State (IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) in Iraq 
and Syria, Salafi jihadists were able to set up an effective propaganda machine on online 
social media such as Twitter and YouTube (Tomé, 2015), spreading fundamentalist views on 
Islam, war reporting, execution videos, and terrorist manuals, to incite fear and hatred and to 
recruit new members (Klausen et al., 2012). For example, on August 19, 2014, a video was 
released on YouTube showing the beheading of abducted US journalist James Foley, to be 
met with worldwide condemnation. The EU subsequently announced a new Code of Conduct, 
and Twitter reported suspending over 125,000 user profiles related to ISIS.11 Insurgents then 
moved to anonymous messaging apps such as Telegram (Weimann, 2016). 
EXTREMISM (EU) 
In the wake of the Syrian crisis, high numbers of refugees arrived in the EU. For example, the 
number of refugees arriving in Germany more than doubled in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). During 
this time, the country also witnessed a number of violent incidents with refugees, such as the 
2015 New Year’s Eve sexual assaults and the December 2016 Berlin truck attack. These 
events sharply polarized the public opinion (YouGov, 2016), which became clear during the 
2017 German federal election, with a 12.6% victory for the far-right AfD. Since then, there 
has been a surge of German far-right propaganda on social media (Davey & Ebner, 2017), 
correlating with increased violence towards refugees (Müller & Schwarz, 2017). For example, 
after a stabbing involving an Iraqi and a Syrian in Chemnitz on August 27, 2017, hundreds of 
far-right protesters took to the streets, “fueled by fake news”, “hunting down” immigrants.12 
In Belgium, authorities have struggled with the prominent role of Belgian foreign fighters in 
Syria and Iraq, and their involvement in the November 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 
Brussels bombings (Van Ostaeyen, 2016), incidentally with US presidential candidate Donald 
Trump calling Brussels a “hellhole”.13 In 2010, the Belgian federal election already revealed a 
deep divide between the left wing and the right wing, which led to a year-long government 
formation crisis. The immigration debate, in particular concerning Muslims, is perceived to 
further polarize opinions (see Torrekens, 2015: 161). To illustrate this, on August 20, 2018, 
Belgian security services issued a remarkable press statement warning that far-right militias 
patrolled the streets “to protect citizens” and that “violent incidents could not be ruled out”.14 
                                               
11 http://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html 
12 http://www.dw.com/en/german-state-official-fake-news-fueled-chemnitz-riots/a-45263589 
13 http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-brussels-is-like-a-hellhole 
14 http://www.sudinfo.be/id70744/article/2018-08-20/selon-la-surete-de-letat-lextreme-droite-se-renforce-en-belgique-plusieurs 
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The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Europol, 2018) notes that violent right-wing 
extremism is expanding, “partly fuelled by fears of a perceived Islamization of society and 
anxiety over migration”, particularly in the case of the far-right Identitarian movement, which 
currently has branches in Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and the US.  
EXTREMISM (US) 
In the US, a nation deeply divided by liberal and conservative views (Westfall et al., 2015), 
new President Donald Trump has successfully tapped into the concerns of conservative “angry 
white men” (Kimmel, 2017), for example by linking immigration to crime, globalization to 
unemployment, and politics to elitism.15 His “post-truth” Twitter messages have been called 
sexist, racist, and contagious (Ott, 2017: 64), and have contributed to a strained relationship 
with the press, each accusing the other of proliferating fake news. A recent study has shown 
that, on Facebook, fake news stories tend to favor Trump (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
Trump has repeatedly framed the press as an 
“Enemy of the People” (Figure 1), drawing 
criticism but also inflaming public sentiment. 
To illustrate this, in August 2018, the New 
York Times received a threatening voicemail 
declaring: “You’re the problem. You are the 
enemy of the people. And although the pen 
might be mightier than the sword, the pen is 
not mightier than the AK-47”. The Boston 
Globe received another call,16 saying: “You’re 
the enemy of the people, and we’re going to 
kill every fucking one of you. […] Still there 
faggot? […] I’m going to shoot you in the 
fucking head later today, at 4 o’clock.”  
The man charged with threatening the Bos-
ton Globe stated that he will continue to do 
so until the newspaper stops its “treasonous” 
attacks on Trump. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example tweets by Donald Trump. 
                                               
15 http://time.com/4566304/donald-trump-revenge-of-the-white-man 
16 http://time.com/5383632/donald-trump-editorial-death-threat 
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SEXISM 
Two recent killing sprees in the US and Canada, the 2014 Isla Vista killings and the 2018 
Toronto van attack, have brought the online male supremacist movement to the attention of 
the media. In particular, both perpetrators self-identified as incels or involuntary celibates, a 
subculture of “angry white men” that blame women for depriving them of sexual contacts, 
using violent, misogynist, homophobic, and racist vernacular (Ging, 2017). For example, one 
user on the Incels.me forum states: “Even if it’s shooting up a school, don’t sit back and do 
nothing”. This shows how hate speech is not necessarily always politically motivated, even 
though ties between male supremacy and the far-right have been observed (Nagle, 2017). 
RACISM (EU) 
In France, anti-immigration and far-right political parties have steadily gained in popularity 
(Golder, 2016). In 2017, the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) qualified for 
the second round of the presidential election and received 33.9% of the votes. The party has 
advocated against immigration, linking it to terrorism and crime (Davies, 2012) and fueling 
xenophobic sentiment in the public opinion, which has been perceived to contribute to the 
rise of racism on social media (Benveniste & Pingaud, 2016). 
In Belgium, the far-right Vlaams Belang rose steadily to 19% of the votes in the 2007 federal 
election, but dropped to 5.8% in 2014, with voters turning to the right-wing N-VA (32.2%), 
in part because the N-VA is not subject to cordon sanitaire (an agreement between all parties 
not to form a coalition with Vlaams Belang). On August 30, 2018, a message was plastered 
on a mosque in Leuven stating: “Vote N-VA, brown people out”, along with Nazi symbolism.17 
RACISM (AF) 
In South Africa, the left-wing ANC has 62.15% of the votes and the far-left EFF 6.35% (third-
largest party). Recently, the government has began advocating for more stringent land reform 
regulations (i.e., expropriation without compensation), to redistribute land owned by white 
Afrikaners (~72%) to black farmers. Commentators have subsequently noted an increase of 
online hate speech targeting white people (e.g., Steward, 2016; Khoza, 2017). At the same 
time, the country has experienced a number of farm attacks that may have been racially 
motivated (see Kerkvliet, 2017), while new hate speech regulations (Bill B9-2018) have been 
criticized for violating freedom of expression.18 
                                               
17 http://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2018/08/31/racist-slur-on-leuven-mosque-alle-bruine-buite 
18 http://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/21/south-african-move-hate-speech-step-too-far 
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2.2 Corpora 
Table 2 provides an overview of the collected corpora:  
DOMAIN REGION LANGUAGE PERIOD GENRE SAMPLE 
JIHADISM Iraq & Syria EN / AR 2014-2016 Twitter 50,000 
EXTREMISM Germany DE 2017-2018 Twitter 55,000 
EXTREMISM Belgium & the Netherlands NL 2017-2018 Twitter 30,000 
EXTREMISM UK / US / Canada EN 2017-2018 Twitter    7,500 
RACISM South Africa EN 2017-2018 Twitter 10,000 
RACISM France FR 2017-2018 Facebook 10,000 
RACISM Belgium NL 2015-2016 Facebook      5,000+ 
SEXISM - EN 2017-2018 Incels.me  65,000 
Table 2. Overview of collected corpora. 
Combined, the corpora cover jihadism (~20%), extremism (40%), racism (10%) and sexism 
(30%), although not every text message in every corpus necessarily constitutes hate speech. 
Most text messages are written in English (~45%), German (25%) and Dutch (15%), which 
are linguistically similar, complemented with messages written in French (5%), Arabic (5%) 
and assorted other languages (5%). Following is a summary of our data collections methods.  
JIHADISM (EN/AR) 
In the period from October 2014 to December 2016, we collected about 50,000 tweets posted 
by 350+ jihadists (De Smedt, De Pauw & Van Ostaeyen, 2018), in the wake of 10 terrorist 
attacks (e.g., Berlin, Brussels, and Paris attacks). For example: “May the streets of France be 
filled with the blood of these filthy kuffar […]” (January 2015). The profiles were identified 
manually using a combination of search keywords (e.g., kuffar, unbelievers), cues in the 
profile usernames (e.g., muhajir, foreign fighter) and profile pictures (e.g., masks, weapons, 
or images of lions, which symbolize bravery). The tweets posted by these profiles were then 
automatically collected using the Pattern toolkit for the Python programming language (De 
Smedt & Daelemans, 2012a). About 40% of the tweets are in English, 30% are in Arabic and 
5% are in French. For comparison, we also collected a companion corpus of 50,000 tweets by 
news agencies, imams, muslimas, etc., that talk about the Syrian crisis without overt bias. 
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EXTREMISM (DE) 
In the period from August 2017 to April 2018 we collected about 55,000 tweets posted by 
100+ German right-wing extremists (Jaki & De Smedt, 2018). For example: “Das Pack gehört 
in Straflager” (the rabble belongs in the camps, March 2018). The profiles were identified 
manually using a combination of search keywords (e.g., Neger, nigger), cues in the profile 
usernames (e.g., 59 = EI, shorthand for Eil Itler) and profile pictures (e.g., Hitler moustache 
parodies, knight crusaders, blue-eyed wolves). The tweets posted by these profiles were then 
automatically collected using Pattern. For comparison, we also collected a companion corpus 
of 20,000 tweets by well-known German politicians, who we expect not to post hate speech, 
and 30,000 random German tweets. About 35% of the data is publicly available in the POLLY 
corpus (De Smedt & Jaki, 2018a), along with other (anonymized) political German tweets.19 
EXTREMISM (NL) 
In the period from September 2017 to August 2018, we used a manual set of high-precision 
Dutch keywords (e.g., makakken, offensive word for Moroccan immigrants) to continuously 
collect tweets and track trends in the data. This resulted in a corpus of about 30,000 tweets, 
and trending insights such as the spread of new offensive words such as kansparel (roughly: 
pearl of opportunity). For example: “Dank u Merkel, alweer een kansparel van u” (thanks 
Merkel, another one of your immigrants, August 2018). Figure 2 shows a timeline of tweets 
collected per month. In general, Dutch hate speech is on the rise. We can also correlate spikes 
in the data to real-world events. For example, on March 16, 2017, we collected 3x as many 
hate tweets as on other days in March, after it became known that a convicted Belgian 
foreign fighter could not be extradited because of human rights concerns.20  
 
Figure 2. Timeline of collected Dutch extremism tweets. 
                                               
19 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1c5peNMjt24U0FcEMSj8gD_JjzumqXTWbPWa_yb2nNt0 
20 https://www.tijd.be/politiek-economie/belgie/federaal/francken-mag-veroordeelde-syriestrijder-niet-uitwijzen/9992783.html 
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EXTREMISM (EN) 
During Google Summer of Code 2018, we collected about 7,500 tweets (Gwóźdź, 2018) with 
political debate in the US (35%), the UK (35%), and Canada (20%), where each tweet has 
been manually annotated with keywords, speech acts (~10% directives), profanity (~15%), 
polarity (45% negative vs 10% positive), mood (15% angry vs 5% happy), gender (50/50 
men vs women), political bias (50/50 left-wing vs right-wing), and metaphors (<1%; see also 
Sulis et al., 2016). For example, “@realDonaldTrump: You are a pathetic, disgusting excuse 
for a human being” is labeled as left-wing, negative, and agitated, with pathetic and disgusting 
marked as profanity. The data is publicly available in Google Sheets as the MAGA corpus.21 
RACISM (FR/NL) 
In February 2018, we collected about 60,000 public posts from Facebook newspaper pages 
such as La Dernière Heure and Le Figaro, using the Graph API (Saoud, 2018). For example: 
“Ton Coran tu te le mets ou je pense, vous n’etes que des barbares” (put your Quran where 
I’m thinking, you are nothing but barbarians). Over 10,000 of these were labeled by multiple 
annotators for racism (high agreement, K=0.92), which constitutes about 15% of the subset. 
These were then used to extract a set of high-precision French racial slurs (e.g., crouille) for 
continuous monitoring. We also annotated over 5,000 posts in Dutch for racism (K=0.60), 
collected from Facebook pages that are likely to attract racist content (Tulkens et al., 2016).  
RACISM (EN/AF) 
In the period from September 2017 to March 2018, we collected over 10,000 tweets with the 
hashtag #Orania (Kotzé & Senekal, 2018). For example: “That #Orania shit place must be 
burnt down, we want them back in Europe” (January, 2018). Orania is a minority community 
in South Africa that seeks to preserve Afrikaner culture and language amongst a majority of 
black African population. The community has been the subject of polarized political debate, 
often being accused by the far-left of upholding racial segregation. 
SEXISM (EN) 
In April 2018, we collected about 65,000 messages by 1,250 users in 3,500 discussion threads 
on the Incels.me forum (Jaki et al., 2018), after a 25-year-old incel killed 10 in the Toronto 
van attack. The corpus contains instances of misogyny (30%), homophobia (15%) and racism 
(3%). For example: “The slut DESERVED the murder 100%” (April, 2018). For comparison, 
we also collected a companion corpus of 40,000 paragraphs of Wikipedia texts (moderated 
for neutrality) and 10,000 random English tweets (to account for internet slang). 
                                               
21 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mFV7uIEbMQ9LyaLRLQc-c0zVfKFn0CY_DakHSYWyPNg 
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2.3 Methodology 
We applied a combination of known “superficial” NLP techniques (e.g., classification models 
based on character trigrams, keyword extraction by word frequency, sentiment analysis using 
dictionaries) on the collected corpora. The study was explorative, meaning that we did not 
apply all techniques to all datasets. Most of the work has been trial-and-error.  
3 Results 
3.1 Text Classification 
Machine Learning (ML) is a subfield of AI that uses statistical techniques to train systems that 
“learn by example”. For example, given 10,000 HATE messages and 10,000 SAFE messages, 
the system will automatically discover that words or word combinations such as filthy pigs 
occur more often in hateful messages, which can then be used as cues to detect whether other 
(unknown) messages are hateful or not. In the process, each training example is mapped to a 
vector of features with weights. The features could be the words in a message for example, 
and the weights could be word count. In our case, we used character trigrams as features, 
where filthy pigs is mapped to { fil, ilt, lth, thy, ... }, so that the system can deal with spelling 
errors, word endings, etc., more efficiently (e.g, filth and filthy will have several overlaps). 
We usually also included character unigrams and bigrams, and word unigrams and bigrams, 
which often raises the predictive performance by a few percent.  
Table 3 provides an overview of the predictive performance for each domain, measured by 
recall (cf., quantity, how many hateful messages are discovered) and precision (cf., quality, 
how many messages predicted as hateful are really hateful), using 10-fold cross validation: 
DOMAIN CLASSIFICATION MODEL TASK LANGUAGE PRECISION RECALL 
JIHADISM support vector machine HATE vs SAFE EN / AR 82% 82% 
EXTREMISM single-layer perceptron HATE vs SAFE DE 84% 84% 
EXTREMISM decision trees  LEFT vs RIGHT EN 82% 81% 
RACISM support vector machine HATE vs SAFE FR 84% 83% 
RACISM support vector machine HATE vs SAFE NL 39% 70% 
SEXISM single-layer perceptron HATE vs SAFE EN 93%  92% 
Table 3. Overview of predictive performance (precision & recall). 
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For example, the LIBSVM algorithm (Chang & Lin, 2011) yields 82% F1 score (the mean of 
precision and recall) for jihadism detection, while Perceptron (Collins, 2002) yields 84% F1 
for German right-wing extremism and 92.5% for sexism. We achieved the best results with a 
deep learning Convolutional Neural Network (CNN; Kim, 2014) for sexism: about 95%. This 
shows that it is useful to discuss automatic detection systems for hate speech. However, such 
systems are also problematic once deployed “in the wild”, because of their high error rate. For 
example, 80% accuracy means that 2 out of 10 SAFE messages are labeled HATE, or vice 
versa, raising ethical concerns. Two other main issues are scalability and interpretability: 
Scalability. In a technical study on automatic detection of offensive language (De Smedt & 
Jaki, 2018b), we discuss how in-domain performance can be misleading when systems are 
applied to out-of-domain data. Classification models may be prone to overfitting, memorizing 
training examples instead of learning general trends, and consequently perform poorly during 
cross-domain evaluation. But cross-domain scalability is essential, since perpetrators will use 
countermeasures against identification (Berger & Perez, 2016), for example by adapting their 
language use. With the rising interest in addressing hate speech online, some systems have 
reported up to 99% accuracy.22 This may be somewhat optimistic, since even policy makers 
and legal experts do not agree on what exactly constitutes hate speech across domains. 
Interpretability. The best results are typically achieved using the most recent deep learning 
techniques. However, the decision-making process of these systems is often also more difficult 
to explain (“black box”), raising legal concerns. In this regard, systems built for deployment 
should adopt a multipronged approach, where the best classification models are accompanied 
by explanatory tools, such as decision trees to inspect the decision-making process, keyword 
dictionaries to highlight words for human moderators, and visualizations of language use like 
word clouds and word trees. Figure 3 shows a decision tree trained on the MAGA corpus: 
 
Figure 3. Decision tree trained on the MAGA corpus (visualization). 
                                               
22 https://i-hls.com/archives/81392 
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Figure 4 shows the source code to train the decision tree on left-wing vs right-wing tweets: 
# coding: utf-8 
# http://github.com/textgain/grasp 
 
from grasp import download, tmp, csv, DecisionTree, wc, tokenize, kfoldcv 
 
# Google Sheets can be downloaded as a CSV-formatted string: 
 
MAGA  = 'https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/%s/gviz/tq?tqx=out:csv&sheet=%s' 
MAGA %= '1mFV7uIEbMQ9LyaLRLQc-c0zVfKFn0CY_DakHSYWyPNg', 'FULL' 
 
# Each training example will be mapped to a {word: count}-dict: 
 
def v(s): 
    return wc(tokenize(s)) # "SAD!" => {'sad': 1, '!': 1} 
 
data = [] 
with tmp(download(MAGA, cached=True)) as f: 
    for r in csv(f.name)[1:]: 
        if r[8].startswith(('left', 'right')): 
            data.append((v(r[2]), r[8])) # (vector, label) 
 
# Calculate precision & recall: 
 
P, R = kfoldcv(DecisionTree, data, k=3, min=100) 
 
print(P) 
print(R) 
Figure 4. Decision tree trained on the MAGA corpus (source code). 
The source code uses the Grasp toolkit for the Python programming language.23 It downloads 
the MAGA corpus from Google Sheets, maps each tweet to a word → count vector, each with 
a LEFT-WING or a RIGHT-WING label, and trains a decision tree with a minimum leaf size of 
100. It then computes precision and recall, using 3-fold cross-validation. We get about 80% F1 
score. As shown in Figure 3, nearly 50% of the labels was learned by hashtags. For example, 
any tweet that contains #libtard, but not #dumptrump, #resist or #boycottrump, will now be 
predicted as RIGHT-WING. The decision-making sounds plausible, however this model is not 
very scalable and may be outdated soon, since popular hashtags change all the time. 
3.2 Keyword Extraction 
Another way to interpret large volumes of text that worked well for us is keyword extraction, 
using feature selection techniques (Liu & Motoda, 2007). Given a HATE and SAFE corpus, we 
can use word count with a chi-square test to expose significantly biased words, and posterior 
probability to find out in what set a word occurs more often. For example, in the JIHADISM 
corpus, the word kuffar (unbeliever) is significantly biased (p<0.05) and occurs in about 3% 
of HATE tweets (1,500x) and 0.05% of SAFE tweets (25x). It is a useful cue for hate speech.  
                                               
23 http://github.com/textgain/grasp 
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By examining keywords across the collected 
corpora, we can identify a number of general 
mechanisms prevalent in all domains: 
Slang. In-group expressions that are used to 
promote group identity by categorizing ad-
versaries, such as coconut (Muslim apostate; 
brown outside, white inside), gutmensch (do-
gooder), stacy (attractive woman). Outsiders 
may not be aware of their meaning, but they 
will be used frequently and hence also stand 
out with keyword extraction. 
Slurs. Disparaging expressions that are used 
to target adversaries by race, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion (e.g., nigger, little bitch, 
infidel, faggot), or to defame political oppo-
nents (e.g., drunkard, dumbass). Typically, a 
small variety is used repeatedly as a means 
of propaganda, defamation, or incitement.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Examples of dehumanization. 
Dehumanization. Disparaging expressions that are used to debase adversaries, to legitimize 
their removal or their extermination. Typically, this involves comparing individuals or groups 
to animals that are seen as unclean (e.g., dog, pig, vermin), describing them as waste (e.g., 
scum, shit, trash) or, predominantly in the case of misogyny, as objects (e.g., cum dumpster). 
Figure 5 shows a number of examples of dehumanization. 
Stereotyping. Generalizing expressions that are used to frame heterogeneous individuals as a 
homogenous group, to argue that they are all accountable for reprehensible behavior based 
on a specific incident (e.g., a crime report). This includes using collective nouns (e.g., horde, 
rabble, wave) to describe immigrants, using social pejoratives (e.g., bum, moron, whore), and 
referring to historical conflicts (e.g., barbarian, crusader, nazi). 
Incitement to crime and violence occurs less frequently, but it is also potentially illegal. It 
usually involves verbs expressing aggression (e.g., fight, kill, rape), directives (arm yourself), 
and indirect speech acts (when will you learn?) that are masked calls-to-action. 
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Table 4 provides an overview of significantly biased HATE words (p<0.05, non-exhaustive): 
DOMAIN SLANG SLURS DEHUMANIZING STEREOTYPING INCITEMENT 
JIHADISM 
brother 
coconut 
lion 
kafir 
murtadd 
rawafid 
dogs 
pigs 
scum 
crusader 
hypocrite 
prostitute 
burn 
destroy 
slaughter 
EXTREMISM (DE) 
gutmensch 
linksgurke 
merkelgast 
muselmann 
nafri 
neger 
gesindel 
pack 
parasiten 
barbaren 
horden 
salafisten 
abschieben 
bewaffnen 
kämpfen 
EXTREMISM (EN) 
brexiteer 
libtard 
snowflake 
bitch 
fucker 
soyboy 
maggot 
puppet 
trash 
clown 
hobo 
moron 
kick 
nuke 
resist 
RACISM (NL) 
bakfietsbobo 
kansparel 
zwette 
bananeplukker 
bruine aap 
makkak 
beesten 
gespuis 
kakkerlakken 
geitenneuker 
kamelenpoeper 
kopvod 
afknallen 
afmaken 
uitroeien 
SEXISM 
beta 
chad 
stacy 
bitch 
faggot 
slut 
cum dumpster 
femoid 
it 
nerd 
white knight 
whore 
beat 
rape 
shoot 
Table 4. Overview of significantly biased HATE words. 
3.3 Collocation Extraction 
Most words are not intrinsically hateful, but can become so in combination with other words 
(e.g., bruine + aap), and the variety of hateful word combinations that people can conjure up 
appears to be infinite. In this regard, collocation extraction (i.e., finding words that co-occur 
often) is a useful approach. One way to accomplish this is by using part-of-speech tagging, an 
NLP technique that identifies word types in context, and then counting what adjectives often 
precede which nouns (for example). In our corpora, this exposes hateful word combinations 
such as white devil, black bitch, bearded carpet kisser and fat Muslim smurf.24  
A related approach, word embeddings (Mikolov, Yih & Zweig, 2013), is also useful. In brief, 
each word is mapped to a skip-gram vector that consists of the words that frequently precede 
or succeed it. This model can then be used to find semantically similar words. For example, 
we automatically expanded a manual dictionary of 100 hateful German words to 2,000 other 
hateful words (including word blends, e.g., refutschies ≈ “refusees”) by querying the German 
Twitter Embeddings (Ruppenhofer, 2018). The resulting dictionary has 75% F1 score and is 
very easy to interpret, for example by highlighting words for human moderators. 
                                               
24 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gVfkxOzLiv47WH506eDseIji96vD2Q4ofFVTiVNUl4c 
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Figure 6 shows the context of keyword women on Incels.me, as a word tree visualization:25 
 
Figure 6. Context for keyword women in online misogyny. 
Skip-gram vectors can also be combined with dimensionality reduction techniques, e.g., to 
reduce each vector to its two most significant features, after which they can be clustered and 
represented as a 2-D visualization. We experimented with spherical k-means clustering 
(Hornik et al., 2012) and t-SNE visualization (Maaten & Hinton, 2008). By visually inspecting 
such clusters, we observed that right-wing extremism mainly focuses on immigration, crime 
and politics, and that the incel community is ethnically highly heterogeneous, contrary to the 
popular belief that male supremacy primarily involves white men. Such insights can usually 
be verified by qualitative analysis, which is more reliable but also more time-consuming. 
4 Analysis 
Not all online hate speech necessarily also involves hateful language. Some instigators simply 
share news updates (mainly crime reports), but only if these reinforce their worldviews, and 
then they will do so perpetually. For example, on an average daily basis, German right-wing 
extremists post 2x more tweets than German politicians did during their election campaign, 
which can be seen as a form of propaganda. On the other hand, such profiles may also simply 
show up more in the search queries that we used to collect the corpus. 
                                               
25 https://developers.google.com/chart/interactive/docs/gallery/wordtree 
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In this section, we provide a summary of NLP techniques that we used to profile instigators 
and their state-of-mind. In general, there is no archetypical instigator, e.g., infighting about 
the community’s belief systems is common. Instead, we argue that unregulated social media 
seems to enable angry persons to band together and stir one another (Sunstein, 2018: 9). 
4.1 Demographic Profiling 
Stylometry refers to NLP techniques that can be used to identify the (anonymous) author of a 
text, based on the topics discussed or cues in writing style (Argamon, Koppel & Pennebaker, 
2009). For example, Pennebaker (2011) has shown that women tend to use more personal 
pronouns (e.g., I, my, we) to talk about relationships, while men use more determiners (the) 
and quantifiers (few, most) to talk about objects and concepts. We used the Textgain API 26 to 
predict the age (75% F1), gender (75% F1), education (80% F1) and personality (60% F1) of 
the profiles in the collected corpora. While age may vary greatly, there is some consistency in 
that most users appear to be 20-40 years old. They are more often male, and tend to be 
somewhat less educated, but this may be an exponent of spelling errors made by non-native 
speakers, or simply a disregard for proper spelling. Consequently, spelling errors can be a 
useful predictive cue (e.g., kakerlakke ~ cockroashes) in combination with other features. 
4.2 Psychological Profiling 
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary (LIWC; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) can 
be used to identify psychological categories for common words. For example, cried is labeled 
as Affective, Negative, Past, Sadness, and Verb. We applied LIWC to the MISOGYNY corpus and 
found that incels tend to express more negative emotions (e.g., anger, uncertainty), display 
more social anxiety, and avoid topics such as family, work, hobbies, goals, and beliefs, which 
we substantiated with more time-consuming qualitative analysis (see Jaki et al., 2018). The 
incels feel left behind by society, or as one user states: “Loneliness has followed me my whole 
life, everywhere. In bars, in cars, sidewalks, stores, everywhere. There’s no escape. I’m God’s 
lonely man.” The in-group recategorization mechanism of the community is then to blame the 
“corrupt system” for their lack of self-esteem, social status, job opportunities, and so on. We 
can wonder about whether this generalizes to instigators in other domains. For example, in 
Belgium, news coverage about job discrimination based on race or gender surfaces every now 
and then.27 In this regard, Wrench (2016) offers more in-depth perspectives. 
                                               
26 https://textgain.com 
27 http://www.brusselstimes.com/opinion/11647/the-integration-process-in-belgium-bureaucracy-inefficiencies-and-incompetence 
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4.3 Sentiment Analysis 
Many users that post hate speech are angry, 
for one reason or another. This is manifested 
in a negative intensity in their language use, 
e.g., adversaries are not simply parasites, but 
fucking parasites, and what they say or do is 
not just nonsensical, but UTTER NONSENSE, 
and enraging, infuriating, unforgivable, etc., 
reinforced with exclamation marks, all caps, 
and emojis such as the angry face, the vomit 
face, or the fist punch (see Figure 7). 
Sentiment analysis refers to NLP approaches 
that detect whether a text is objective (facts) 
or subjective (opinions), and if it is subject-
tive, if it is positive or negative (Liu, 2012). 
This is often accomplished with a dictionary 
of adjective scores (good +0.5, bad –0.5) or 
models trained on reviews and star ratings. 
Since negative adjectives occur frequently in 
hate speech, the sentiment score predicted 
by these systems is usually negative as well, 
which can be a good predictive cue. Figure 8 
shows the average polarity in random Wiki-
pedia articles and tweets vs hate speech. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Examples of negativity markers. 
 
Figure 8. Sentiment polarity comparison. 
Using open source sentiment dictionaries that report about 80% F1 score (e.g., De Smedt & 
Daelemans, 2012b), we found that jihadist hate speech is more negative than random tweets, 
that German right-wing extremism tweets are even more negative, as well as the majority of 
incel misogyny (~65%) and Dutch racism (~75%). In the South African domain, sentiment 
analysis was less accurate, for example because many open source dictionaries assign a 
negative score to apartheid, which occurs frequently in neutral South African political debate 
(e.g., “We explain what is Orania, how it was established after the end of apartheid” is mis-
labeled as negative). We did note that negative sentiment is less common in tweets that take 
a defensive view (i.e., pro Orania) than in tweets with and offensive view (against Orania).  
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4.4 Network Analysis 
In cases where we need to find the “influencers”, i.e., the users that post original content and 
that are frequently cited, we found network analysis to be useful. Essentially, messages in the 
corpus are mapped to an X CITES Y graph, for example by extracting the authors’ usernames 
(X) and @retweeted usernames in their messages (Y). Mathematical techniques from graph 
theory can then be applied to gain insight. In the JIHADISM corpus, we were able to discern 
between fans and insurgents by using eigenvector centrality (cf. Page et al., 1999), which 
assigns a greater weight to nodes that are indirectly linked more often. This exposed a 
number of usernames belonging to ISIS recruiters that have later been convicted in court. 
Figure 9 shows an example (some usernames belong to neutral experts and news media). 
The main problem is that usernames usually do not reveal the author’s real name, so when 
the profile is suspended, a new profile appears, and with current NLP techniques it is hard to 
detect whether such profiles are one and the same user. For more specialized methods that 
have been used to examine terrorist networks, see Benigni, Joseph & Carley (2017). 
 
Figure 9. Example hate cluster, pruned by eigenvector centrality. 
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5 Discussion 
In this report, we have outlined general findings on online hate speech in different languages 
and domains. We demonstrated how detecting such content is theoretically viable, with an in-
domain accuracy of about 80-95%. We believe that our study of the varied, yet often similar 
corpora can be relevant to future research on online hate speech, and may also have practical 
benefits, such as providing training material for detection and de-escalation of conflicts 
online. However, automatic detection of hate speech is challenging for a number of legal and 
ethical reasons. For one, hate speech laws often tend to be vague, in an attempt to capture a 
wide range of problematic content without infringing on the freedom of expression of private 
citizens. Without a well-defined legal framework, what exactly are we detecting? What is the 
threshold from sharing a personal opinion in a fit of anger to defamation and incitement? 
Also, the new GDPR 28 regulations now curtail the kind of data that can be collected in the EU 
(“right to be forgotten”).29 Countering online hate speech using automated techniques may 
well be outside the legal realm, despite all good intentions. 
Hate speech can target women and men alike, and any ethnicity, ideology or religion, so it is 
hard to come up with a linguistic definition. There is no standardized “list of bad words”, and 
if there is, then perpetrators are very creative in coining new offensive terminology. Online 
machine learning algorithms may be useful to continuously learn to detect evolving rhetoric, 
but even if such approaches are successful, perpetrators can always argue that they were only 
joking. Finally, developing useful technology tools does not mean that IT companies will 
adopt it, e.g., Facebook will not remove Holocaust denial.30 
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